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Climate policy is typically seen as informed by scientific evidence that anthropogenic carbon 
emissions require reducing in order to avoid dangerous consequences. However, agreement on 
these matters has not translated into effective policy. Using interviews with local authority officials 
in he UK’s East Midlands region, this paper argues that the ideas, arguments and data informing 
local climate policy have been grounded in evidence from the natural sciences. Focusing on carbon 
emissions data demonstrated a consensus around scientific knowledge, not local policy responses to 
this knowledge. Acknowledging this ‘mistaken consensus’ provides the potential to utilise evidence 
more attentive to local contexts.
key words climate change • local government • evidence-based policy •  
performance management
Introduction
[G]uidance of modern society will fail as long as it tries to circumvent 
politics. (van Gunsteren, 1976, 150–1)
The UK 2008 Climate Change Act transformed a global policy issue into national 
legislation, establishing unprecedented targets for reducing emissions, namely ‘that 
the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 
baseline’. Reducing carbon emissions was justified by scientific evidence. The target 
itself was chosen by policy makers. The Act marked a landmark in the development 
of climate policy, and ‘a tremendous success’ for the environmental groups who had 
research
SPECIAL ISSUE • Evidence and meaning in policy making
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campaigned to have such targets enshrined in law (Big Ask, 2008). However, the 
scale of the ambition raises the question of whether the targets could be achieved.
In a policy area dominated by global and national approaches, this paper examines 
local authority climate policy within the UK region of the East Midlands in the 
period after the Act’s introduction. I argue that conceiving of local climate policy as 
being driven and measured in terms of national carbon emissions hampers its chances 
of being supported by strong evidence. Following Weiss’s (1991) tripartite typology 
of evidence – ideas, arguments and data – I show the role evidence played in the 
formulation of local climate policy from 2008–11. I identify a prevailing notion in 
climate policy that emissions reduction should be the primary aim, as suggested by 
evidence on climate change trends from the physical sciences. This notion dovetails 
with managerial forms of local governance in the UK, emissions reduction being 
a policy goal amenable to performance management regimes. In uncovering the 
meanings of local climate policy and the evidence informing it, more fruitful, oblique 
strategies for future climate policy become apparent.
This paper has five main sections. First, there is a review of literature, placing 
Weiss’s framework in the context of critical studies of climate policy and knowledge. 
Following a brief review of research methods, the evidence framework is explored 
in more detail, with discussions of ideas, arguments and data within local climate 
policy. In particular, the section on data offers theoretical development on Weiss’s 
framework by demonstrating the difference between data that commensurate (defined 
as the establishment of a common means for measuring different objects and practices in 
society) and those that mark (Espeland and Stevens, 2008). In conclusion, the paper 
reviews the findings and identifies potential futures for research and policy practice. 
Evidence and climate policy
Climate change was first an issue of climate science. But climate change is 
now mostly a political process… (von Storch, quoted in Hulme, 2013, ii)
This insight by a prominent climate scientist highlights two widely agreed aspects of 
the climate debate. First, the agenda was initially set by science, with two centuries of 
research developing into an understanding that climate change could be dangerous 
to humans (Hansen et al, 1981; Hulme and Turnpenny, 2004; Kellogg, 1987). Second, 
from this understanding climate change emerged as a political issue in 1988, the year 
of Professor James Hansen’s testimony to US Congress and the formation of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014). This 
suggests a linear relationship between scientific evidence and policy developments 
within climate change. However, both empirical work into the influence of research 
on policy and insights from interpretive theory have come to question such a 
relationship (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009; Majone, 1989; Sanderson, 2003; Sullivan, 
2011). One key scholar in this literature, Carol Weiss (1991), unpacks the idea of 
evidence as a singular category, instead proposing a typology of argument, ideas and 
data, reflecting different assumptions about policy making and different conditions 
for them becoming influential on policy (Table 1).
Weiss’s framework opens up the notion of evidence to categories beyond research 
data, highlighting how issues of concern enter policy agendas and how policy responses 
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Table 1: Weiss’s typology of policy research
Type of evidence Definition Assumptions about 
policy making
Conditions for 
influence
Ideas Research findings 
transmuted into 
generalised ‘story’
Humanistic; problem 
formulation may not 
match requirements of 
decision makers
Early stages of policy 
discussion; high 
uncertainty
Arguments Data used selectively 
for policy advocacy
Adversarial decision 
making
Conflictual areas; 
ongoing legitimation of 
decisions
Data Reports heavy on data 
and interpretations
Technocratic, little goal 
conflict
Value and goal 
consensus
Source: Adapted from Weiss (1991, 37–42)
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to those issues are shaped. This chimes with literature in science and technology 
studies which, while often reaching different conclusions, questions the assumption 
that scientific evidence alone can drive climate policy (Eastin et al, 2011; Grundmann 
and Stehr, 2012, 119–78; Jasanoff, 2010; Pielke Jr, 2007; Sarewitz, 2004; Wynne, 2010). 
Sarewitz (2011, 476) provides a succinct account of this argument, outlining ‘the plan’ 
implicit in the development of climate science and policy:
Broadly speaking, the plan has two familiar components. The first component 
is that scientific knowledge about climate change, widely disseminated 
through society, will lead to action that will allow society to effectively 
confront and resolve the problem. Science will lead to action by compelling 
a convergence of people’s world views around the need to take action. 
But what action? The second component of the plan is that this convergence 
of understanding will translate into a consequent convergence around what 
needs to be done. In this case, action has come to mean reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions and especially fossil fuel consumption, in order to minimize 
human interference with and disturbance of the global climate system, thus 
in turn reducing the negative impacts on society due to this disturbance of 
the climate.
In identifying scientific knowledge as central to the way climate policy has unfolded, 
Sarewitz (2011, 479) notes that the reports of the IPCC came to implicitly endorse the 
international emissions control and monitoring regime being negotiated within the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Miller, 2004). Crucially, 
both of these processes are global in scope, contributing to the dominant framing 
of climate change as a scientific problem on a planetary scale which underplays the 
diversity of contexts and circumstances affecting citizens’ perspectives on the issue 
(Demeritt, 2001, 329). This insight underlies this paper’s analysis of local climate policy. 
This intertwining of research findings and policy advocacy fits into Weiss’s evidence 
typology as argument, making ‘a tidy package for use in bureaucratic or legislative 
negotiations’ (1991, 39). The convergence around understanding and what needs to 
be done, identified by Sarewitz, is akin to the value and goal consensus identified 
by Weiss as the conditions for data becoming influential as evidence (see Table 1): 
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Table 2: Weiss’s typology applied to climate policy
Time Type of 
evidence
Use in climate policy Relation to Weiss typology
t1 Idea Climate change as serious problem 
caused by humans
Translation of scientific evidence 
into simple ‘story’
t2 Argument Reduce carbon emissions to 
address problem
Advocacy of particular policy to 
tackle the problem
t3 Data Monitor and manage carbon 
emissions
Consensus over policy response 
leads to focus on emissions data
Warren Pearce
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value consensus that scientific knowledge shapes our understanding of the world 
and what courses of action we should take, leading to a consensus on the goal of 
reducing carbon emissions and a shift to carbon emissions data as an influential form 
of evidence. Table 2 summarises the role of idea, argument and data in climate policy, 
Critics of these developments point to a ‘short-circuiting’ of the move from idea 
to argument shown in Table 2. In translating largely undisputed matters of fact, such 
as the physical processes of the greenhouse effect, into political matters of concern, 
climate change is articulated as a global crisis beyond dispute (Swyngedouw, 2010, 
217; following Latour, 2004). For Swyngedouw, this is a manifestation of a post-
politics, where managerialism reigns and expert knowledge predominates over political 
position (2010, 225). Such managerialism has become increasingly important within 
lo al government since the 1980s (Andrews et al, 2005, 640; Hood, 2006; Wilson 
and Game, 2006, 361–4). A focus on quantitative measurement of carbon emissions 
proved more amenable to managerial modes of governance than previous iterations 
of environmental policy, such as sustainable development, which focused more on 
the linkages between the environmental and the social (Cohen et al, 1998, 359).
This section has introduced Weiss’s typology of evidence, and discussed it within 
the context of critical literature on the evolution of climate policy. In particular, it 
has established three principles for the exploration of the use of evidence within local 
climate policy. First, scientific knowledge has played a central role in the framing of 
climate policy. Second, this knowledge has been conceived of, and articulated at, a 
global level. Third, these characteristics have in turn driven an approach to climate 
policy centred on the management of carbon emissions. All of these play an important 
role in the exploration of ideas, argument and data in local climate policy which 
follows. 
Research methods
This paper draws on conversational interviews undertaken with two categories of 
participant from the nine unitary and upper tier local authorities in the UK region 
of the East Midlands:
• the climate change manager (CCM) responsible for overall climate policy within 
each of the nine local authorities.
• elected councillors (Cllrs) whose portfolio included climate policy (the exact 
composition of these portfolios varied between local authorities). The councillors 
interviewed were from a smaller sample of four local authorities.1
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Participants were interviewed in two waves of  ‘cultural’ and ‘topical’ interviews 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 9–11).2 The first wave of interviews (June 2010–March 
2011) were cultural; that is, participants explained the generalities of behaviour, norms 
and values with agenda-setting by the interviewer kept to a minimum. The second 
wave of interviews (March–August 2011) were more topical in style, piecing together 
the participant’s narrative of issues already highlighted by themselves and others as 
significant. This mix of styles enabled a focusing down on particular topics between 
the first and second interviews, and facilitated cross-checking of meanings between 
different participants. Care was taken to allow participants to present the elements of 
their story which they regarded as significant, while allowing the researcher time to 
probe some of the unspoken assumptions lying beneath the surface (Stephens, 2007, 
206). Interview transcripts were coded thematically, recognising that this was a process 
of interpretation rather than a mirror on reality (Yanow, 2000, 87).3 The anonymous 
quotes used here are representative of the wider corpus of data.
Evidence 1: ideas
I have argued that scientific knowledge about climate change has been assumed to 
motivate policy action. This has been evident in the close relationship between IPCC 
reports and negotiations through the United Nations. In this section, I argue that 
this global modus operandi has also been evident within the UK at national and local 
levels. This is exemplified by comments on the IPCC’s report on the physical science 
basis for climate change in 2007, by the then Environment Minister, David Miliband:
The report confirms our concerns that the window of opportunity to avoid 
dangerous climate change is closing more quickly than previously thought… 
showing that the debate over the science of climate change is well and truly 
over. What’s now urgently needed is the international political commitment 
to take action to avoid dangerous climate change. This has been absent so 
far…. This first report by the IPCC, and others to follow later this year, can 
provide a strong evidence base needed to move the prospects of agreement 
closer. (DEFRA, 2007)
Miliband clearly states the perceived importance of climate science as a motivator 
for action. A report on the physical science basis for climate change is portrayed as 
the evidence needed to stimulate ‘political commitment’ where none previously 
existed. Underlying this logic is an assumption that the variable within the physical 
science evidence which is influenced by humans – carbon emissions – is that which 
should be targeted by climate policies. Indeed, within the UK government this 
assumption appeared warranted, with the passing of the 2008 Climate Change Act, 
which established a governmental duty ‘that the net UK carbon account is at least 
80% lower than the 1990 baseline’. In addition, the Act states that this duty can 
only be amended following ‘significant developments in scientific knowledge… or 
international law’. The policy goal established by the Act foregrounds carbon dioxide 
and its universal, predictable properties, while skirting the socioeconomic context of 
emissions (Demeritt, 2001, 313).
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Table 3: Definitions of National Indicators relating to climate change mitigation
NI Title
185 CO2 reduction from local authority operations
186 Per capita reduction in CO2 emission in the local authority area
Source: DCLG, 2008, 51
Warren Pearce
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These national developments influenced local climate policy, with carbon dioxide 
emission targets introduced as part of the National Indicators (NIs) framework for 
monitoring local government progress on priority policy areas (DCLG, 2008, 5–7). 
Such targets were presented as a means for local areas to contribute to the carbon 
budgets introduced by the Climate Change Act (EMCCP, 2009, 3). Targets were 
negotiated between local authorities, stakeholder organisations and the regional 
Government Offices (satellites of central government departments) as part of Local 
Area Agreements. These agreements set local policy priorities for the period 2008–11 
with targets measurable using NIs (DCLG, 2008, 5). From a total of 198 NIs, two 
dealt with carbon dioxide emissions, as shown in Table 3 (DCLG, 2008, 12).
NI185 had a narrow focus, reporting only emissions from a local authority’s own 
operations (DECC, 2009a, 55). NI186 was broader, measuring area-wide carbon 
dioxide emissions per capita omitting large point emissions sources which were judged 
to be beyond the influence of local authorities, such as motorways and members of 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (for example, large power stations) (DCLG, 2008, 
51). Such was climate change’s rapid rise to prominence at that time that it was the 
fifth most selected policy priority in such agreements (Audit Commission, 2009, 18), 
pr ving more popular than established issues such as crime, childhood obesity and 
education (Schroeder and Bulkeley, 2009, 324). Out of 150 Local Area Agreements 
within England, 100 set targets for the reduction of either NI185 or NI186 (Eadson, 
2008, 140). The enthusiasm for adopting climate change measures reflected ‘an 
expansion in the consciousness, intent and, perhaps, commitment, on the part of local 
authorities in general to “do something”’ (Footitt, Wood, and Turnpenny, 2007, 24).
The East Midlands appeared to show a particularly strong consensus to ‘do 
something’ in response to the scientific evidence for climate change and the political 
targets formulated on the basis of it. It was the first English region to have all of 
its local authorities sign the Nottingham Declaration, a voluntary commitment to 
address climate change locally (EMCCP, 2009, 3). All nine of the region’s Local Area 
Agreements included climate change mitigation indicators, seven opting for NI186 
and two for the narrower NI185 (EMCCP, 2009, 15). NI186’s area-wide focus offered 
the advantage that it included the local authority operations measured by NI185, 
enabling local authorities to get ‘both indicators… for the price of one’ (Pearce and 
Cooper, 2011, 209). However, local authorities had significant concerns over NI186 
which, although not dissuading many from adopting the indicator, were to play a 
role in the subsequent interpretation of the climate change agenda.
These developments appear to support the framework for influential evidence 
proposed in the previous section, with climate change moving from an object of 
scientific enquiry to become a powerful social, political and cultural idea (Hulme, 
2009, 61–70). The next section critically analyses the political arguments for local 
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carbon emission reduction which flowed from the idea of climate change, arguing 
that while a consensus emerged within local areas around the scientific idea of climate 
change, this was not the same as political convergence about how to respond.
Evidence 2: arguments
In her depiction of the intertwining of research and advocacy as argument, Weiss 
highlights the political dimension of evidence-based policy, particularly in conflictual 
policy debates. However, as already argued, climate policy in the late 2000s had 
the appearance of a policy issue becoming characterised by consensus rather than 
conflict. Decades of complex research in various branches of climate science had 
been transmuted into a simple story for policy makers: carbon dioxide emissions 
from human activities are changing the earth’s climate with potentially dangerous 
consequences for society. However, the consensus within East Midlands local 
authorities that climate change was a problem did not translate into agreement on 
what should be done about it and, in particular, how emissions should be reduced. 
A survey of inner-city, suburban and rural households elsewhere in the UK shows 
how public commitment to action was often thin, focusing on ‘easy’ measures such 
as recycling at the expense of more ‘difficult’ steps such as energy conservation or 
reducing car use (Whitmarsh, 2009, 21). In addition, overall public interest in a number 
of public policy issues, including climate change, waned after 2008 in the wake of 
the financial crisis (Climate Sock, 2010). 
Interviews with local authority actors supported the notion that public support for 
climate change policy may have been weaker than previously thought. None of the 
elected councillors interviewed with responsibility for climate policy described the 
issue as one which voters remarked upon ‘on the doorstep’. The issue proved not to 
have the same resonance for members of the public and, by extension, local authority 
councillors, as managers focused on the longer term. One councillor expressed the 
view, echoed by councillors in two other local authorities, that this disjoint between 
the perspectives of managers and the public was an issue when it came to securing 
support for action:
I’m not necessarily 100% popular with my officers for this view, but if you walk 
out and say to somebody on the street out there, “we’re going to save the planet 
by cutting down CO2, right?” I don’t think you’re going to get an amazing 
amount of people leaping up and down about that. (LA2 Cllr interview 1)
As well as noting public apathy on climate change, this quote underlines the disjoint 
between expert and lay opinion. While climate change had been prioritised as an 
overarching theme by many local authorities, its peripheral status within public 
concerns left it short of political support in an environment of increased public 
and media scrutiny of local authority expenditure. Managers who were personally 
convinced of the need for strong local climate change policies also came to recognise 
this gap:
I think that’s one of our problems with the general public, we talk glibly 
about climate change. Why do they need to bother about climate change? 
They just need to know about practical things they can do which can help 
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them improve their quality of life, and that can be energy efficiency, saving 
a bit of money on your fuel bills. I just think we put ourselves on a pedestal 
with this and don’t really understand what’s happening around us and how 
our customers view this agenda. (LA3 CCM interview 1)
This gap can be explained by a divergence between the global framing and local 
understanding of climate change. As outlined above, the issue became established 
as a policy priority in the 2000s, with climate change becoming a commonly used 
label in the public lexicon (Nerlich et al, 2010, 97–9). While this helped establish 
the understanding of climate change locally, its policy mobilisation through 
NI186 reinforced its dominant framing as scientific in the discussion of causes and 
managerial in the discussion of solutions. As a result, climate change did not hold 
significant meaning for individuals thinking about their everyday existence in the 
local environment.
While a focus on climate science established the conditions for consensus, it elided 
the political, and inherently conflictual nature of how to reduce emissions:
By excluding any obviously, social or political matters, the scientific 
reductionism of CC [climate change] makes consensus possible, but the result 
is, in some sense, irrelevant. The things that can be known with scientific certainty 
are not necessarily the most important to know. So, for example, the science of 
CC can agree about the physical sources of carbon emissions, but only by 
refusing to consider the far more important and deeply political question 
of why they are increasing and how (or if) they should be curtailed. (Cohen 
et al, 1998, 360–1, emphasis added)
This short-circuiting of the translation from scientific facts into public concerns 
forecloses political argument in favour of the type of managerial approach exemplified 
by NI186 (Swyngedouw, 2010). However, as Weiss notes in her discussion of types of 
evidence, political argument is necessary ‘[i]n order to bring along the organizations 
and individuals who will carry out decisions, there is a continuing need for 
legitimation’ (1991, 42). So while sidelining conflict may appeal to political elites, it 
may be impossible to sustain democratic support for policies without such conflict 
(Machin, 2013, 101–103). This was reflected in a national survey finding that only 
35% of local authorities were maintaining the same commitment to climate change 
work following budget cuts and the demise of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) in 
2010 (Scott, 2011, 14–15). 
This section has shown that the argument for focusing on emissions reduction 
inherent in ‘the plan’ didn’t enjoy the levels of political support suggested by local 
authorities’ early commitments to the Nottingham Declaration and their subsequent 
adoption of emissions targets as climate policy evidence. The next section examines 
this disjoint in detail, highlighting the divergent meanings of emissions data between 
central and local government. 
Evidence 3: data
This section focuses on NI186, the measure of area-wide emissions selected by the 
majority of East Midlands local authorities. Weiss’s framework helps us to understand 
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why data became important as a consensus appeared to emerge that climate change 
was a priority issue. However, further work is required to uncover the meaning of 
this evidence selected to inform local policy. In particular, this section distinguishes 
between numerical data that commensurate and those that mark. Counting can be 
a means of commensuration, establishing a common means for measuring different 
objects (Espeland and Stevens, 2008, 408). These metrics can be ordinal, like league 
table rankings, or ratio measures, like carbon dioxide emissions. Alternatively, counting 
can be a means of marking a category (Espeland and Stevens, 2008, 407). For example, 
numbers on the back of footballers’ shirts identify the players, both individually and 
as part of a particular team, but the numbers do not have a metric relationship to 
each other; the numbers do not relate to the players’ relative skill levels. This section 
shows how NI186 data was intended by central government to commensurate carbon 
emissions in the spirit of ‘the plan’, but was regarded by local government managers 
only as a means of marking climate change as a policy priority. 
Data that commensurate
As argued above, the decision to count a particular object reflects the preferences of 
those in positions of power within the policy process, rather than a value-free decision 
of selecting the ‘best’ evidence. That central government introduced an indicator 
(NI186), which measured the totality of carbon emissions within local areas was 
unsurprising, given the linear relationship assumed between climate change problem 
and solution, as well as between science and policy. As outlined in the previous section 
the knowledge that climate change is caused by rising emissions was assumed to imply 
a singular focus on emissions reduction. While this is accurate from a natural sciences 
pe spective, such logic produced different meanings within the social practice of 
public policy. In focusing only on carbon emissions, NI186 emphasised the chemical 
by-products of various social practices while erasing almost all the social context 
for such emissions (other than population size). Carbon emissions are pervasive; it is 
hard to imagine any practices that do not entail such emissions of some kind. As a 
result, NI186 commensurated a gamut of social activities and judged them in terms 
of their carbon emissions alone. No distinction was made, for example, between car 
emissions in a city, where public transport options are likely to exist, and in a rural 
area, where such alternatives are likely to be in scant supply. For central government 
this commensuration made sense within ‘the plan’ of translating evidence from the 
natural sciences into public policy, but such a logic made less sense to local climate 
policy managers for two reasons: misgivings about the data and a dearth of policy 
‘levers’ to affect emissions. 
First, NI186 excluded local actors from the production of data, engendering 
suspicion in data accuracy. One manager held a general scepticism about the accuracy 
of area-wide emission measures:
The robustness of that data is very questionable anyway. You’re carbon 
footprinting the... [whole area]. There’s so many inaccuracies with this whole 
exercise when you’re trying to carbon footprint your own authority, let 
alone an area. You factor that up, it’s just quite mindboggling. (LA3 CCM 
interview 1)
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Another manager focused on the similarities between the emission trends of different 
local areas, casting doubt on the 44% of data derived from disaggregated modelling:
If you look at the data, nearly everywhere follows the same sort of trajectory, 
which makes you wonder. Obviously it’s a difficult thing to put statistics 
together on, but it’s just a bit odd that all the trajectories are exactly the 
same. And there’s so much top-down disaggregated stuff isn’t there, rather 
than aggregating actual impact from the community areas. (LA1 CCM 
interview 1)
While such misgivings about the data were common amongst managers, they did not 
invoke any statistical analysis of their own to counter the NI186 methodology. Instead 
they used their own local experiences and observations as the basis for scepticism, 
reflecting criteria established in the literature for lay judgement of expert opinion 
(Wynne, 1992, 298).  While local authority officers could be termed ‘expert’ on 
policy, this expertise did not extend to data collection. When asked about the details 
of a project to collect local carbon data, one officer replied “I don’t know how you 
go about doing it, that’s why I get experts to do it” (LA4 CCM interview 1). In one 
local authority adopting NI186, the manager attempted to address negativity over 
the data by commissioning their own study of local area emissions based on a more 
‘bottom-up’ methodology. The data that resulted from this study, carried out by a local 
university, was largely consistent with the existing NI186 data. Despite this apparent 
confirmation of data quality from a local source, the manager continued to take a 
dim view of the reliability of the centrally produced statistics:
We had a lot of very good local carbon data which actually cross-referenced 
against the data produced for 186, and it was pretty similar… [But] to be 
basing the whole of our targets on 186 data is not reliable. (LA4 CCM 
interview 1)
The persistent scepticism about data reliability, even after the corroborating ‘second 
opinion’ from a local expert source, suggests managers held an inherent distrust of 
centralised data production, regardless of the statistical validity of the data itself. The 
introduction of NI186 was intended to move power and responsibility from central 
to local government, but the means of monitoring progress remained controlled by 
central government. The NI framework made a virtue of the small number of new 
datasets required from local authorities to report performance, which Whitehall 
described as ‘reducing data burdens’ on local government (DCLG, 2008, 22–3). 
This may have eased a strain on local government resources, but also contributed to 
disengagement with NI186, as managers saw the indicator’s methodology as beyond 
their capacity to influence. One manager expressed a feeling of passivity when referring 
to the NI186 data as being “pumped out to us every year” (LA3 CCM interview 1), 
reflecting the distance felt between centrally-compiled scientific data and local context. 
Local authorities were also unable to check NI186 data before publication due 
to pre-release secrecy rules for official National Statistics (DECC, 2011, 5). The 
centralisation of data production fostered a lack of understanding and suspicion in 
NI186 from the very people whom it was intended to help, local climate change 
managers. Together with NI186’s methodological complexity this left the data 
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Table 4: National policy exerts the greatest influence over local emissions measured by 
NI186
Category of policy measures with influence over local carbon dioxide emissions %
1 Purely national measures but still influencing community emissions 71.2
2 National measures for which local authority influence can improve performance 25.9
3 Purely local measures implemented by local authorities or other organisations 2.8
Sources: AEA Technology, 2008, 36; Eadson, 2008, 146
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production appearing to local managers as a ‘black box’ closed to the contribution 
of local knowledge. While central government had good intentions of producing a 
consistent dataset and reducing local authority burdens, their actions occasioned a 
negative local perception of NI186, which in turn provided the context for weak 
implementation of climate change mitigation policy.
Second, suspicion of centrally produced data was a manifestation of a wider worry 
for local managers: a lack of control over policy. There was a widely held view that 
local authorities’ scope for influencing emissions was tiny in comparison to the 
potential for central government action: 
I don’t think what we’re doing in that plan is going to have much effect on 
it, it’s only ever going to have a 1% impact. The government must recognise 
it has a lot more power to affect carbon dioxide emissions. (LA5 CCM 
interview 2)
The impact a local authority can have in terms of area-wide emissions is 
minimal. The biggest impact anyone can have is national government in 
terms of policy and fiscal measures. (LA3 CCM interview 1)
These views were supported by central government reports showing that local policy 
measures would have no influence over the majority of an area’s emissions. While 
there was considerable uncertainty about the degree of influence local authorities 
could exert over category 2 (Table 4), the overall picture was one of local performance 
under NI186 being largely determined by national policies. One official estimate was 
that categories 2 and 3 in Table 4 would total a reduction of only 5.1% between 2005 
and 2010 (DECC, 2009b, 56). This compared with East Midlands local authorities’ 
aggregated target of a 10% reduction over the same period (EMCCP, 2009, 15), 
suggesting that local authorities had influence over only half of the emissions they 
had committed themselves to reduce. This contradicts a fundamental of performance 
management, that an indicator should have controllability and measure only what 
is the responsibility of the manager (Jackson, 1988, 12). Instead, local managers had 
no influence over 71.2% of NI186 emissions, with less than 3% of emissions being 
purely influenced by local measures, although these were the responsibility of the 
local partnership, rather than the local authority manager.
So, to commensurate a local area’s carbon emissions may have appeared a logical 
translation of scientific knowledge into policy-relevant evidence, but it excluded 
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local knowledge about both the contexts for such emissions and the ability of local 
authorities to exercise control over the sources of such emissions. However, seven 
out of nine East Midlands local authorities adopted NI186 despite recognising the 
data’s flaws as effective evidence for policy. The next section explains this apparent 
puzzle as a divergence of meaning between central government and local authority 
managers. For the latter, the meaning of NI186 was to mark the importance of carbon 
emissions rather than a trustworthy way to commensurate such emissions.
Data that mark
Agreement about the idea of climate change as a policy priority has already been 
demonstrated as the East Midlands became the first region to have all of its local 
authorities sign up to the Nottingham Declaration, a voluntary commitment to 
addressing climate change locally (EMCCP, 2009, 3). While signatory authorities 
were far from sure to follow up this action with a coherent climate change strategy 
(Carty and Hislop, 2007, 8), it underscored the increased public awareness of the 
issue prompting local councillors to respond with a statement of intent (House 
of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2008, 20–21). This response was 
reinforced by ‘wilful individuals’ working within local authority environment units, 
who developed expertise and enthusiasm working on Local Agenda 21 throughout 
the 1990s and seized on climate change as a new manifestation of the sustainability 
agenda (Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2005, 20–22). Local authorities’ engagement 
with the agenda implied a willingness to adopt an indicator measuring area-wide 
emission reduction, but this jarred with the flaws in NI186 outlined above. The 
resulting dilemma was summarised by one local authority manager familiar with the 
LAA negotiation process:
Our view was when 186 came out, well we’re not going to say no because 
we’ve been asking for this for a very long time, but a) we have no resources, 
and b) we have no control. (LA6 CCM interview 1)
While two local authorities felt strongly enough about NI186’s weaknesses to reject 
it in favour of NI185, most did not want to back away from the more ambitious 
NI186. However, demonstrating credibility to central government and the public was 
not the only salient issue in indicator choice. In selecting NI186, local authorities 
prioritised its symbolic importance over the flaws in its design to demonstrate that 
carbon dioxide reduction was a local priority within an institutional context. To 
do this, carbon emission reduction had to be established within local government’s 
performance management regime. By including NI186 within their LAAs climate 
policy became mainstream and justified the allocation of resources to it:
NI186’s power is to raise the profile of climate change within a formal 
performance management structure. The fact we have NI186… within our 
LAA is a good indication of our commitment to the climate change agenda. 
(LA4 CCM interview 1)
Climate change managers seized the opportunity of raising the issue’s priority 
within their local authorities. By introducing NI186 into performance management 
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frameworks, climate change would no longer be seen as an issue of fringe concern. 
For central government and senior management in local authorities, the meaning of 
NI186 was the transformation of climate change into an area of policy that could be 
measured and managed in the same way as others within the existing performance 
management regime:
It’s meaningless really but the politicians and performance management 
people for the LAA use it [NI186] as “Have we passed or not?” (LA3 CCM 
interview 1)
From the perspective of this climate change manager, NI186’s flaws turned the 
data into ‘meaningless’ evidence. Instead, it was the very acts of measurement and 
monitoring that were important, as they gave climate change new meaning as a 
mainstream policy concern for local authorities and created the space within which 
they could introduce new programmes. This meaning emerged as a result of the 
acts themselves, rather than the data they produced. Returning to Espeland and 
Stevens’s (2008, 407) analogy of shirt numbers signifying, but not rating, footballers, 
NI186 ensured that climate policy was ‘in the game’ of local authority performance 
management. NI186 data was adopted not as a source of evidence but as a marker 
of the importance of climate change. 
This section has analysed the use of data as evidence for local climate policy, 
supporting Weiss’s observation that data becomes influential in conditions of goal 
consensus. The category of ‘data’ has been unpacked, noting that NI186 had different 
meanings for central government  (commensuration) and local climate managers 
(marking). This insight is key in understanding the ‘mistaken consensus’ in climate 
policy, the difference between agreement that there is a problem and agreement about 
what to do about the problem. While central government looked to stick to ‘the plan’ 
of managing carbon emissions, local authority managers were aware that basing their 
climate policies on this data was inappropriate in terms of both their own power to 
influence events and the need to maintain political support. 
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, it was argued that the local dimension of climate policy 
is under-researched, and in particular that there is an absence of literature examining 
the meaning of evidence employed for such policy. This article has filled the gap by 
unpacking the theoretical concept of ‘evidence’ into three categories: ideas, arguments 
and data. It has highlighted the importance of climate change’s framing as a global 
policy issue informed by evidence from the natural sciences, and how this framing 
contributed to the adoption of local-area emissions despite the reservations of some 
local authority managers. While NI186 and the wider indicator set have now been 
abolished, these findings remain relevant as local authorities continue to report their 
emissions to central government and emissions data remains at the heart of UK climate 
policy. Future research into local climate policy should not take a prioritisation of 
emissions reduction as read. Rather, an unpacking of the different types of evidence 
used to inform policy should be at the heart of attempts to evaluate policy success.
The paper has demonstrated the usefulness of Weiss’s evidence framework as a 
starting point in determining how local climate policy came to be defined in the 
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late 2000s, while also offering theoretical improvement through a treatment of data 
that acknowledges the potential for actors to ascribe different meanings to the same 
data. While the notion that data does not speak for itself is familiar in interpretive 
policy analysis (Stone, 2002, 163–87; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006,  xvii–xix), it 
bears repeating in climate policy which continue to rest heavily on quantitative data. 
While scientific knowledge in climate change has established the issue’s importance, 
its translation into evidence as data that commensurates has not equated to practical 
policy knowledge (Grundmann and Stehr, 2012, 175). That many localities adopted 
such data regardless, highlights how the demands of managerialism can prevail over 
politics.
To date, local authority managers have let their climate policies be guided by global 
discourses of emissions reduction. Managers’ doubts about measuring emissions locally, 
in conjunction with evidence that global climate policies are not having the desired 
effect (Prins et al, 2010), points to the possibility of a different course. Rather than 
focusing directly on climate change in the belief that it is a problem tameable (that is, 
not wicked) through managerial governance, a more oblique strategy could address 
policy areas for which climate stewardship is a contingent benefit (Rayner, 2010; 
Sarewitz and Pielke Jr, 2000; Sarewitz, 2011; The Economist, 2010). These kindred 
policies would not have emissions reduction as their first order priority, but trade 
adherence to a global framing of climate policy for feasibility within the financial and 
political constraints local authorities find themselves under (Pearce, 2013, 209–35). 
These could include improved public transport provision, greater use of district heating 
schemes, improved domestic energy efficiency and continued reduction of rubbish 
sent to landfill. Political support can also be harnessed for ongoing work adapting to 
fu ure risks exacerbated by climate change. In all of these cases local political support 
can be harnessed more readily through immediate, tangible benefits. 
This suggests a more fluid movement between ideas, argument and data than the 
chronology suggested earlier in this paper (Table 2). The current focus on data does 
not appear to be delivering local results, suggesting that either new arguments or ideas 
should return as evidence to inform policy. A shift back to finding political arguments 
focusing on policy responses is called for, rather than the mere acceptance of scientific 
data. Without such a shift, it may be that new evidence to drive climate policy comes 
in the form of changing ideas rather than arguments. If the idea of climate change 
changes from something requiring recognition to something to be left to its own 
devices, then climate policies will suffer a more grievous blow. In short, it may be 
difficult for some to accept a more politically palatable, oblique approach to climate 
policy. However, if better political arguments for action cannot be mounted, the 
alternative may be the disappearance of climate change from policy agendas altogether.
Notes
1 This ‘information-oriented’ sample (as opposed to random), was selected with reference 
to local authorities’ priority National Indicators, and whether they were urban or rural 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, 230).
2 On one occasion, an incumbent councillor could not be interviewed for personal reasons.
3 For additional information about research practice, see Pearce (2013, 99–138).
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